NYT on Grameen Bank

Available here:

"The elephant in the room is the question: If microfinance doesn’t accomplish anything positive, then why are 128 million poor families busy taking loans? Should we assume that poor people simply don’t know what’s in their best interest? Or do we need to look more deeply into the way poor people survive?

That’s what a number of creative researchers are doing today. One example is the collaboration between Daryl Collins, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford and Orlanda Ruthven that culminated in the excellent book “Portfolios of the Poor: How the World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day.” The book takes a penetrating look into 300 poor families in Bangladesh, South Africa, and India, with interviews conducted every two weeks to track expenses, earnings and cash flow at a granular level. What the researchers found was striking, and it gets to the question of what it really means for most people to be poor: to live with perpetual uncertainty.

“What the research taught us is that the problem of living on $1 or $2 a day is that you don’t actually earn $1 or $2 every day,” explained Jonathan Morduch. “That’s just an average. Some days you receive $5 and then nothing for two weeks. Life is unreliable. So the challenge for the poor is that you need to put together the right sums to deal with the right challenges in life. And what we saw microfinance was doing for people was offering them a reliable source of money. With microfinance, you get a sum of money that’s promised on the day it’s promised in the amount that’s promised. It’s often the only reliable service that poor people have — and that’s incredibly powerful.”"

NYT: China's new five-year plan

NYT is reporting on China's new five-year plan, which seeks to shift the engine of economic growth from exports to domestic consumption, largely through letting incomes rise:

"The government pledged to keep prices “basically stable” through 2015, limiting inflation to 4 percent this year, and to raise household income by an annual average of 7 percent, roughly in line with economic growth. That would break from the past 20 years, in which the growth of ordinary workers’ income has regularly lagged behind the growth in gross domestic product, and consumer spending as a share of the economy has dropped to a record low. The report called expanding domestic demand “a long-term strategic principle” and pledged to increase subsidies to low-income households, extend broadband Internet to rural areas and smaller cities, and expand retail sectors like chain stores and online commerce."

In economic development terms, this is called "strategy switching," and the move China seems to be making is something commentators including David Kennedy have been talking about for some time. Get ready for one of the largest markets in the world to become even larger.

Popular support for Iran's nuclear program

From the NYT:

"Why such strong support for nuclear energy in a country whose natural endowments don’t exactly leave it devoid of energy sources? The history of Iran’s nuclear program is long and tortuous, and there have definitely been periods (possibly including now) when the government was trying to develop nukes. But at the popular level, a separate motivation has taken shape: pride in the technical prowess embodied in the program.

This pride may have grown more intense and nationalistic under Western pressure to constrain the program. Though most Iranians say sanctions already imposed on the country have hurt it, 86 percent of them - and 78 percent of Mousavi supporters - say that Iran should not "give up its nuclear activities regardless of the circumstances.""

Cyprus: further movement toward a political solution

This article originally appeared in the Harvard International Law Journal.

After numerous false starts, negotiations between the two parties to the decades-old stalemate in Cyprus seem to be moving forward again, this time with the assistance of UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, who recently made his first official visit to Cyprus. The island nation has been divided into a Greek-speaking south and a Turkish-speaking north since 1974, when a Greek-led coup sought to annex the island to Greece, prompting a Turkish invasion that claimed the top 37% of the island. The north, which calls itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), has only been recognized by Turkey, and has lagged behind the impressive economic development of the south, which enjoys broad international recognition and now represents the island in the European Union. UN peacekeepers patrol the unofficial border between the two sides, and the island is heavily militarized.

Previous talks have been derailed by a number of contentious issues; the most serious recent attempt at unification, in 2004, produced an agreement which was subsequently ratified in a referendum by the north but rejected, under the hard-line presidency of Tassos Papadopoulos, by the south. Papadopoulos has since been replaced by the more moderate Demetris Christofias, but the Turkish Cypriot leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, now faces a challenge in upcoming elections from a more hard-line candidate. This has ramped up the pressure for a solution, as has the fact that the ongoing stalemate has dimmed Turkey’s prospects in its own bid for EU accession.

Legal issues relating to the conflict stem originally from the question of whether the 1974 Turkish invasion was justified as a matter of international law. Greek Cypriots argue that the invasion was a clear violation of the UN Charter, which prohibits aggressive war; their argument is supported by the fact that no multilateral body authorized the action. Turkish Cypriots counter that Turkey’s response was justified, as a form of self-defense, by the prospect of the island’s annexation to Greece, and, as a form of humanitarian intervention, by longstanding intercommunal violence directed toward the Turkish-speaking minority. Going forward, both political and legal solutions will be needed to address issues including the division of contested territory, the presence of Turkish forces, reparations for lost property, and power sharing under a proposed federation.

For more information, please click here.

John Yoo explains the torture memos

Balkinization offers this commentary on John Yoo's recent discussion of the torture memos:

"That is, the torture memos were written not to define "torture" with respect to new situations where the statute was unclear; rather they were written to allow the CIA to get around the legal ban on torture, even to the point of arguing that the torture statute would be unconstitutional if applied to persons acting under the direction of the President as commander-in-chief. The torture memos were not a hypothetical lawyer's exercise to guide future conduct. They were written in order to ensure that members of the CIA would never be prosecuted for torture."

DOJ presents recommendations for Guantánamo detainees

From the New York Times:

"The Obama administration has decided to continue to imprison without trials nearly 50 detainees at the Guantánamo Bay military prison in Cuba because a high-level task force has concluded that they are too difficult to prosecute but too dangerous to release, an administration official said on Thursday. However, the administration has decided that nearly 40 other detainees should be prosecuted for terrorism or related war crimes. And the remaining prisoners, about 110 men, should be repatriated or transferred to other countries for possible release, the official said, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak about the numbers."

Without knowing all the facts, I think this is the wrong decision. If the 50 detainees the administration proposes to imprison without trial pose a legitimate threat to the United States, the government should be able to (and required to) present some evidence to that effect, at least in the context of a military commission (which has its own problems, but is better than indefinite detention). Contentious arguments about humanitarian law aside, one of Obama's promises in taking office was to end the "law-free zone" that GTMO had become under the Bush administration. In that context, this feels like a step in the wrong direction.

Karzai seeks reconciliation with moderate Taliban

From the New York Times:

"Mr. Omer’s remarks suggested the government had a softer line than the Americans on talking to Taliban leaders. "We are ready to negotiate with anyone," he said. "Whoever comes over is welcome."

A spokesman for the Taliban in southern Afghanistan, Qari Yousuf Ahmadi, ruled out any possibility of negotiations with Mr. Karzai's government. "We are united and we will remain united against them," Mr. Ahmadi said in a telephone interview. "There is no differentiation between Taliban moderates and extremists. We are fighting under one name, Taliban, under one leadership.""

Media self-censorship in Mexico

From the Committee to Protect Journalists:

"Often, it starts this way; the journalist is told how to handle a particular story. Usually it’s a phone call. They’re told that maybe they should ignore the story. Or, maybe they should pump it up to make a person or an opposing criminal or political group look bad, or make another group look especially good. If the journalist doesn’t follow the order they are threatened with death. They know that’s an easy threat to carry out because in Mexico almost no one is ever prosecuted for killing a journalist. Then the self-censorship starts. Soon, the journalist doesn’t even need to be told how to handle the stories. He or she knows already. It becomes automatic. It has to be automatic because that’s the way to stay alive."

Honduras institutes ICJ proceedings against Brazil

This article originally appeared in the online digest of the Harvard International Law Journal.

The interim government of Honduras has filed a complaint against Brazil in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court announced on October 29. The complaint arises from events surrounding the surprise return to Honduras of Manuel Zelaya, the deposed president, who entered the country on September 21 and took refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa. Specifically, Honduras charges that Mr. Zelaya and an unknown number of other Honduran citizens have been using the Embassy as a “platform for political propaganda” with the complicity of Embassy staff and thereby “threatening the peace and internal public order of Honduras.” Honduras has requested declaratory and injunctive relief from the ICJ.

The legal bases of Honduras’s complaint are Article 2 (7) of the UN Charter, which reserves to member states matters which are “essentially within [their] domestic jurisdiction,” and the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. As a practical matter, Honduras’s complaint is only one element of a broader political and diplomatic offensive aimed at preventing Mr. Zelaya from returning to power before the upcoming presidential elections scheduled for November 29. It is unclear whether the ICJ will agree to hear the complaint, which was filed by an interim administration that many international observers consider illegitimate. Current efforts toward national reconciliation may also determine whether the case goes forward.

For more information, please click here.

Demise of American grand strategy

I'd like to point out that I haven't been linking to NYT as much now that I started using Google Reader (don't worry NYT, I still love you). This is from James Goldgeier, writing in CFR about American "strategic drift" since the fall of the Berlin Wall:

"What became clear by the time Bill Clinton became president was that formulating a simple and relevant new strategic purpose for the United States was no easy task. Clinton often harangued his aides for failing to come up with a Kennanesque vision, believing that he needed a replacement for containment to explain his foreign policy to the American people. His top State Department advisers even arranged a dinner in 1994 with Kennan, who was still going strong at age 90. The old master's response to their quest? Forget the bumper sticker, he said, the world was now too complex. Try, instead, he suggested, "for a thoughtful paragraph or two."

Kennan had hit upon a central truth of the post-Cold War world: with no single enemy and a range of diverse challenges--including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, climate change, pandemics, terrorism, the rise of new great powers, and globalization--there would be no bumper sticker."

Climate change and human rights law

From Opinio Juris:

"I argue that the solution is to look to the duty of international cooperation, which requires states to try to act as a single global polity to address the global threat of climate change. By providing a basis for the application of the environmental human rights jurisprudence, this approach would allow states some flexibility as to the substance of their joint decisions, but only if they follow procedures designed to ensure full, well-informed participation by those most affected. Moreover, the substance of decisions that result from such processes would not be entitled to complete deference: under no conditions could states allow climate change to destroy the human rights of the most vulnerable."

U.N. Rapporteur questions legal basis of U.S. Predator program

This article originally appeared in the online digest of the Harvard International Law Journal.

The legality of the U.S. Government’s use of unmanned Predator drones to target militants in Afghanistan and Pakistan has recently come under increasing scrutiny, as a prominent U.N. representative called the American refusal to discuss the program “untenable”. Philip Alston, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions, made his remarks while reiterating requests for the U.S. to provide information on the legal rationale for its use of the drones, the mechanisms it uses to review the program, and the precautions it takes to make sure its air strikes conform with international law.

The debate over the legality of remote-controlled air strikes turns largely on the question of whether the American pursuit of terrorists represents an active armed conflict analogous to a conventional war between nations. As such, the debate over the drones is one example of the broader disagreement which has resulted from the application of international humanitarian law (IHL) to the “war on terror.” IHL, which regulates armed conflict between states, requires the existence of an active conflict, and only applies within the geographic limits of that conflict. Within these limits, IHL authorizes the killing of enemy combatants, including remotely, subject to limitations meant to assure that the use of force is necessary, minimally injurious to civilians, and proportional to expected military gains. Outside a zone of active conflict, however, IHL does not apply, and the U.S. ability to kill individuals without according them due process of law is restrained by a 1976 executive order against assassinations and, arguably, by international human rights law.

While some observers would call Afghanistan a zone of active conflict, far fewer would apply that description to Pakistan, and drones operated by the C.I.A. have been active in targeting militants there, including Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in August. American drones have also targeted militants in Yemen. In extending IHL to cover these strikes, supporters of the program have argued for the application of IHL wherever terrorists are found, not merely within geographically bounded zones of conflict. This is a novel argument, and as such, the use of Predators to target individuals outside the “war zones” of Afghanistan and Iraq arguably represents a violation of international law. It also represents a sharp departure from pre-9/11 U.S. policy, when C.I.A. drones were limited to conducting surveillance and the U.S. Government criticized Israel for conducting targeted killings of Palestinian militants.

Supporters of the C.I.A. program have argued that, whether or not IHL applies to the air strikes, they are lawful under both the UN Charter and the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) as a form of “anticipatory self-defense.” But opponents point to the principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention in the affairs of other states, arguing that individuals outside active war zones should be brought to justice through domestic processes of law. The question of whether the air strikes are proportional under IHL is also debated; the New Yorker reports that the effort to kill Baitullah Mehsud involved a series of 15 air strikes killing more than 200 other people. Finally, the loosening of geographic restrictions on state-sanctioned lethal force raises the uncomfortable prospect of an amorphous, global definition of conflict, which other states or non-state actors could potentially use to target Americans.

The practical value of the C.I.A. program is also debated. While the use of Predators has been credited with eliminating numerous Al Qaeda leaders and sowing confusion within the organization, it has also led to many civilian casualties, which has rallied anti-American sentiment in the very places where the U.S. is trying hardest to win “hearts and minds.” Another criticism of the program is that electing to kill terrorists rather than capture and interrogate them reduces the intelligence the U.S. can gather on its enemies; proponents of this argument point to the potential information value of Saad bin Laden, one of Osama’s sons, who was killed by a Predator strike in Pakistan. Finally, the recent inclusion of prominent Afghan drug traffickers on the list of acceptable targets has led critics to wonder whether there is any coherent policy limiting the use of the drones to individuals who pose a direct threat to the United States.

Whatever the legal and practical arguments for or against the use of unmanned air strikes against non-state actors, they are unlikely to end in the near future. In the rugged, inaccessible areas where many militants operate, the U.S. Government often believes that it has no good alternatives to the drones. Facing resistance to its plans to increase troop levels in Afghanistan, the Obama administration may make remote-controlled warfare an ever more central part of its counterterrorism strategy.

For more information, please click here and here.

Abdullah defends decision to withdraw from election

In this video from the BBC. Analysis from NYT is here.

HuffPo: Abdullah to boycott runoff

"Karzai rejected Abdullah Abdullah's conditions for next Saturday's vote, including removing top election officials whom the challenger accused of involvement in cheating in the first-round balloting in August. Abdullah has called a press conference for 10 a.m. Sunday to announce his final decision after Afghans and Westerners close to the challenger said he would withdraw. His campaign manager Satar Murad said the candidate might still change his mind, but that "as of now" he planned to call for a boycott. A clouded electoral picture would further complicate the Obama administration's efforts to decide whether to send tens of thousands more troops to Afghanistan to battle the Taliban and its al-Qaida allies." Full story is here.

Afghan Electoral Complaints Commission finds need for runoff

The NYT is reporting that Karzai is resisting the Commission's report, deepening Afghanistan's ongoing constitutional crisis. Certification of the results by the Independent Election Commission is expected to lead either to a runoff or to a power-sharing agreement between Karzai and Dr. Abdullah, his closest challenger.

Obama's Nobel Peace Prize: Say what?

The announcement that a person whom I greatly respect and admire has won a Nobel Peace Prize, you might think, would fill me with a sense of satisfaction. Not so the announcement, on Friday, that President Obama had won this prestigious accolade less than nine months into his first term. Don't get me wrong: I, like many other people who are scratching their heads over this unexpected turn of events, remain a staunch Obama supporter. I believe that, in both foreign and domestic policy, he has been making sensible decisions, setting the right tone, and generally doing as well as can be expected under the (very challenging) circumstances. But let's be honest: Obama's accomplishments to date have consisted of staffing up executive agencies, putting out a few of the many fires left by the Bush administration, and taking preliminary steps toward his other policy objectives. While very arguably the right moves to be making at this time, these are hardly the stuff of Nobel Peace Prizes, and the major challenges of the Obama administration are not only unresolved, but perhaps even unknown.

The Nobel Committee's reasoning in awarding the prize more or less acknowledged the above:

"Announcing the award, the Nobel committee cited Mr. Obama "for his extraordinary efforts to strengthen international diplomacy and cooperation between peoples" and said that he had "created a new climate in international politics." In a four-paragraph statement, it praised Mr. Obama for his tone, his preference for negotiation and multilateral diplomacy and his vision of a cooperative world of shared values, shorn of nuclear weapons. "Only very rarely has a person to the same extent as Obama captured the world's attention and given its people hope for a better future," the committee said. "His diplomacy is founded in the concept that those who are to lead the world must do so on the basis of values and attitudes that are shared by the majority of the world’s population."

The suspicion on most sides seems to be that the Committe's decision is less a reflection of the young administration's accomplishments than of Europe's relief to have a new face in the White House:

"For a world that at times felt pushed around by a more unilateralist Bush administration, the prize for Mr. Obama seemed wrapped in gratitude for his willingness to listen and negotiate, as well as for his positions on climate change and nuclear disarmament."

Um, right. As numerous commentators have noted, the prize is likely to represent more of a liability than a benefit for the president as he tries to move forward with his agenda; the perception that he is playing better in Europe than at home will feed right into the Republicans' stock arguments. Having heard so much about the potential for outside intervention in other countries to create political backlash, we may be getting a taste of it ourselves.

Map of Afghan election results

The Afghan Independent Election Commission's map of preliminary results by province is here. The counting is progressing more slowly than expected; preliminary nationwide results were expected two days ago. Instead, only 17% of the vote has been counted. Within that 17%, Karzai leads Abdullah by 44% to 35%. Thanks to Paul Hamill.

Breaking news: Pajhwok calling election for Karzai

This doesn't seem to have been picked up by major news services, but Afghan independent news agency Pajhwok is reporting that, with approximately two thirds of the votes counted, Karzai is heading toward an outright victory with 70% of the vote. Official preliminary results are not expected until Tuesday. In the contest between election-rigging and voter intimidation, rigging may have won.

Abdullah for Afghanistan

For whatever it's worth, I want to go on record as endorsing Dr. Abdullah Abdullah for president of Afghanistan. Elections are scheduled for tomorrow and the BBC is reporting that voter registration cards are on sale in Kabul for $10. Compare that, by the way, to the Lebanese elections, where political parties were offering expats round trip airfare in return for their votes.

As a foreigner, I'm not sure whether I'm formally entitled to an opinion, but I have one. As my friend Graeme said, if you approve of the way things are going in your country, vote for the incumbent. If you don't, vote for someone in the opposition who isn't crazy. I think both Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani fit this bill, and Abdullah seems to be the only opposition candidate who is polling well enough to potentially send the election to a runoff.

Elizabeth Rubin's recent NYT piece offered a revealing glimpse of Karzai's descent into cronyism, remoteness, and the politics of self-preservation:

"Other close friends of Karzai describe his leadership style as a kind of three-card monte where you never know which card will appear. One card is tribal. “His father was head of the tribe, and in tribal culture you depend on loyalty of individuals rather than institutions,” said Ali Jalali, his former interior minister and a friend from refugee days in Pakistan. “You always try to be a patron to people close and loyal to you.” The second is the factional politics of resistance in Peshawar, where mujahedin leaders organized their resistance to the Soviet occupation. “Jihadi politics is mostly wheeling, dealing, no strategy, all tactical,” Jalali continued. “Please people here. Break promises there.” And the third is democracy. He cherishes the values of democracy but has no faith in its institutions. “How he reconciles these competing demands creates his style of leadership,” Jalali said. In reality, said another friend, “he sees human rights, freedom of the press, the law, the constitution as chains around his hands and legs.”"

Against this backdrop, Abdullah has been running on a platform of change which has borrowed rhetorically from the Obama campaign:

"I'm asking you to believe not only in my ability to bring about necessary change and hope in our beloved country, Afghanistan, but I'm also asking you to believe in your own potential to change the course of our history."

Specifically, Abdullah advocates devolution of power from the imperial presidency crafted by Karzai and his international backers, including through the direct election of provincial governors and a greater role for the parliament. He also advocates national reconciliation through a more meaningful dialogue with the Talibs and other extremist elements, although as numerous observers have pointed out, that is likely to be easier said than done.

While fake voter registration cards proliferate, the Taliban has stepped up violence in the lead-up to the election and plans to attack polling stations, which is likely to disproportionately affect the Pashtun south (see here for discussion of recent polling). Under these circumstances, not only the outcome but also the legitimacy of the election and its chance of producing a result which will be broadly credible to the Afghan people all seem to be anyone's guess.

Countdown to the Afghan elections

Presidential elections in Afghanistan are now only a few weeks away, scheduled to take place on August 20. Within the past few weeks, a challenger to the deeply unpopular president, Hamid Karzai, has emerged in Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, an optometrist and former foreign minister. As the NYT is reporting, Abdullah has been drawing crowds across the country by giving voice to widespread discontent over corruption and incompetence within the Karzai administration. Most interesting to me are Abdullah's policy positions on parliamentary and local governance, which match my observations and also parallel some of Thomas Barfield's recommendations:

"Today, Dr. Abdullah, with a diplomat and a surgeon as his running mates, is seen as part of a younger generation of Afghans keen to move away from the nation’s reliance on warlords and older mujahedeen leaders and to clean up and recast the practice of governing. To do that, he advocates the devolution of power from the strong presidency built up under Mr. Karzai to a parliamentary system that he says will be more representative. He is also calling for a system of electing officials for Afghanistan’s 34 provinces and nearly 400 districts as a way to build support for the government."

The significant power built up by Karzai, reflected in the constitution and implemented in cooperation with then-ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, has come at the price of both the Afghan parliament and local governance. The parliament, to which my friend Michael Metrinko served as a liaison, has been largely marginalized, including in the lawmaking process, while Afghanistan's 34 provincial governors, appointed directly by the president with no direct accountability to their constituents, represent a constant source of corruption and mismanagement.

Although Karzai's popularity has been hovering around a dismal 30%, he is still seen as the most likely winner of the upcoming election. This is partly because of the widespread fraud which is expected to accompany the process; in combination with security concerns, this will likely serve to keep people away from the polls. Karzai also benefits from his ability, as the recipient of international aid money, to strike alliances with influential power-brokers, to campaign on the international dime, and to control state-run media. Interestingly, he ducked out of a recent debate with Dr. Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani on Tolo TV, an independent station, leaving an empty lectern as a telling symbol of his administration.

Although Karzai looks likely to win, some factors may play to his disadvantage. The most important of these is the deep-seated dissatisfaction of ordinary Afghans, who have seen growth stagnate and security deteriorate in spite of the billions of dollars that have poured into the country. Karzai may also be hurt by the security situation in the heavily-Pashtun south, which may disproportionately affect members of his ethnic group. The Obama administration, while ramping up military assistance to Afghanistan (as it should), has taken steps to distance itself from the Karzai administration. Under the circumstances, the best outcome may be a runoff, which will result if no candidate captures a majority of the vote.